What Kind of Evidence Does Descartes Give to Support His Position About the Nature of Mind and Body

Descartes on the separateness of mind and body

August 23, 2006

1 The method of doubt
ii What cannot be doubted
3 Why the mind cannot be identical to any trunk
4 The nature of the mind/body distinction
5 Descartes' view of the relationship between mind and body
6 Varieties of dualism

one The method of doubt

In the selection from the Meditations on First Philosophy that nosotros read, Descartes argues that the mind is something distinct from any body. Simply the Meditations begins with a word of a topic seemingly far removed from the nature of the mind: the question of whether we can be certain of the truth of any of our opinions. What we have to see is how this question is related to questions about the relationship between listen and body.

Descartes begins (1.v) past noting that his opinions up to this indicate have been based on his senses, simply that we cannot be certain that our senses do not deceive us. This is in part because we cannot be certain that what we think of every bit our sensations of the earth are not a dream:

"How ofttimes have I dreamt that I was in these familiar circumstances, that I was dressed, and occupied this place past the fire, when I was lying undressed in bed? At the present moment ...I look upon this paper with eyes wide awake; ...but I cannot forget that, at other times I have been deceived in sleep by similar illusions; and, attentively considering those cases, I perceive and so clearly that there be no certain marks by which the state of waking can always be distinguished from sleep, that I feel profoundly astonished ..." (1.vii)

And then, Descartes argues, there seems to be some sense in which I am less than certain most the existence of the bodies I seem to exist perceiving. Information technology seems to me that in that location is a computer monitor in front of me right now; but, because "there exist no certain marks past which the land of waking tin ever be distinguished from sleep" I cannot be sure that I am not dreaming of a calculator monitor rather than seeing one.

Descartes uses the figure of an 'evil demon' to brand much the same signal:

" I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly skillful and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who is at one time exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all external things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by means of which this existence has laid snares for my credulity; I will consider myself equally without hands, eyes, flesh, blood, or any of the senses, and as falsely believing that I am possessed of these ..." (one.12)

The point of this, for our purposes, is not whether it is plausible or reasonable to believe that we are constantly beingness deceived past an evil demon; we can assume that this is non a reasonable thing to believe. Rather, the important point is that, by reflecting on scenarios like dreaming and existence deceived past an evil demon, information technology seems possible to doubt whether whatever of the external, physical things which we seem to perceive really do exist.

2 What cannot exist doubted

At the beginning of the second Meditation, Descartes wonders whether there is anything whose existence cannot be doubted:

"I suppose, accordingly, that all the things which I encounter are fake (fictitious); I believe that none of those objects which my fallacious retentivity represents ever existed; I suppose that I possess no senses; I believe that body, effigy, extension, motion, and place are but fictions of my mind. What is there, so, that can exist esteemed true ? Perhaps this just, that there is absolutely aught certain." (2.two)

Only he quickly finds that this is not the instance; fifty-fifty though he can doubt the existence of any external thing, he cannot dubiousness his own beingness:

"Only I had the persuasion that there was absolutely naught in the world, that in that location was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I non, therefore, at the same time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I convincingly existed, since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it almost that I am nothing, then long equally I shall exist conscious that I am something. So that it must, in fine, exist maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum ) I am, I be, is necessarily truthful each time it is expressed past me, or conceived in my mind." (2.3)

The aforementioned line of reasoning appears to carry over to particular episodes of thinking. Just equally an evil demon cannot deceive me about my own existence, he cannot deceive me about the fact that I am existence deceived.

3 Why the mind cannot be identical to whatsoever body

Then far, nosotros seem to have two results: that information technology is possible to doubt whether any external, concrete things be, but that information technology is not possible to doubt that oneself, or one's ain mental episodes, exist. At this point, yous might ask: and so what? What does this show nigh the human relationship between the listen and the body?

Descartes is most explicit about this in paragraph nine of Meditation vi:

"And, firstly, because I know that all which I clearly and distinctly conceive can exist produced past God exactly as I conceive it, it is sufficient that I am able conspicuously and distinctly to conceive ane thing apart from some other, in order to be certain that the one is unlike from the other, seeing they may at to the lowest degree exist fabricated to exist separately, past the omnipotence of God; and information technology matters not by what power this separation is made, in lodge to exist compelled to judge them different; and, therefore, merely because I know with certitude that I exist, and because, in the meantime, I exercise non discover that naught necessarily belongs to my nature or essence across my beingness a thinking affair, I rightly conclude that my essence consists only in my being a thinking thing or a substance whose whole essence or nature is merely thinking]. And although I may, or rather, equally I will shortly say, although I certainly practise possess a trunk with which I am very closely conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I take a clear and distinct idea of myself, in equally far as I am but a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct thought of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is sure that I, that is, my listen, by which I am what I am], is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without information technology."

And so see how this argument works, it helps to break it down into steps. First, Descartes says that if he tin can "clearly and distinctly" conceive some state of affairs, so God could create that situation. So, if he tin can clearly and distinctly conceive some state of affairs, so that situation is possible. The stardom between possible and impossible situations, and contingent and necessary truths.

And then, if Descartes is correct, we tin show that it is possible that x and y are distinct things by conspicuously and distinctly conceiving of them equally distinct. What he wants to bear witness is that it is possible that listen and body are singled-out; so what he needs to show is that he tin can conspicuously and distinctly excogitate of mind and torso as singled-out. But, in a sense, he has already shown this. In Meditation 1, Descartes doubted the being of cloth bodies; so, he was conceiving of bodies non existing. Only, in Meditation two, he found that he could non doubtfulness his own existence. And then, in this method of incertitude, he was conceiving of his mind every bit existing, merely of bodies equally not existing. Then he was conceiving of his mind as distinct from his body. So, if the to a higher place is correct, it follows that it is possible that his mind is distinct from his body.

But what we want to know is non whether it is possible for ane'due south heed to be distinct from one's body; what we desire to know is whether minds really are distinct from bodies. How can we become from ane thesis to the other? The necessity of identity equally bridging this gap in the argument.

We tin can call up of Descartes' argument for the distinctness of mind and body every bit breaking down into steps as follows:

1.	If I can conspicuously and distinctly excogitate of such and such being the case, God could make such and such the example.
2.	If God could make such and such the case, then such and such is possible.
3.	If I can clearly and distinctly conceive of such and such being the case, then such and such is possible. (1,two)
four.	I tin conspicuously and distinctly excogitate of the listen existing without the body.
5.	I tin conspicuously and distinctly conceive of a case at that place the mind the body. (4)
half dozen.	It is possible that the listen the body. (three,5)
vii.	If a = b, so necessarily a = b.
C.	The mind the body.

Is this statement valid? Is information technology sound?

Can you see how to run a parallel argument to show that detail mental events — similar certain thoughts, or pains — are not identical to any material bodies, or concrete events?

iv The nature of the listen/body distinction

So we know that Descartes thinks that the listen is something other than the body; but what, exactly, does that mean? One fashion to respond this question is to get clearer on what Descartes thinks bodies are. Descartes oftentimes speaks of bodies as extended; part of what he means is expressed in the following passage:

"Past body I sympathise all that tin can be terminated by a certain figure; that can exist comprised in a certain place, and then fill a certain infinite as therefrom to exclude every other body." (2.5)

One of the defining aspects of bodies is that they are extended in space: that they accept certain dimensions. Should we conclude from this that Descartes thinks that bodies do non exist in space — that they have no dimensions? Does this make sense? Does it follow that they are not located anywhere?

5 Descartes' view of the relationship between heed and body

And so far, nosotros've examined Descartes' argument that the mind is not identical to whatsoever body. But this tells us what the relationship of heed to body is non; it does not tell usa what it is. In i place, Descartes gives his view of the human relationship of heed and trunk past an analogy:

"Nature likewise teaches me past these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc., that I am non merely lodged in my trunk every bit a pilot in a vessel, but that I am as well so intimately conjoined, and every bit information technology were intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a sure unity." (6.13)

What can nosotros take from the thought that the relationship betwixt mind and body is alike to the relationship between pilot and vessel? 1 thing a airplane pilot does is control the vessel; by steering, pilots crusade vessels to do things. So we would expect Descartes to think that minds sometimes cause bodies to practice things. And this is what he thinks (see amid other places, 6.12-13). Why this fits well with common sense.

It seems, and then, that we can sum upwardly the master points of Descartes' dualist view of the relationship between mind and torso as follows:

1. The listen is not identical to whatsoever trunk. Nor are item mental events (particular episodes of thinking, feeling, etc.) identical to any bodies.
2. Bodies are defined by Descartes as things which take extension. Since minds are not identical to any bodies, minds do not have extension. So minds do non exist in space.
3. Bodies sometimes cause effects in minds, and minds sometimes cause furnishings in bodies.

six Varieties of dualism

Nosotros tin divide out two parts of Descartes view, via the distinction between objects or substances on the one hand, and properties on the other. A style to become a handle on this distinction via the stardom between names and predicates.

Respective to the distinction between substances and predicates is a stardom between two kinds of dualism. The property dualist says that mental properties — like feeling a pain or thinking about food — are not identical to whatsoever physical property. The substance dualist says that there are mental substances — minds — which are not identical to whatever physical things. Descartes was both a substance dualist and a holding dualist. In this first part of the grade, where we focus on the listen-torso problem, the most important part of his view is his property dualism. (Though Descartes himself spends most of his time talking nearly substance dualism.) In the 2nd part of the course, when nosotros talk over the nature of persons, we'll return to substance dualism.

One good question at this point is: what is the relationship between substance dualism and property dualism? If substance dualism is true, does it follow logically that property dualism must be true equally well? How about the other way around?

Another distinction between kinds of dualism is worth making here. We noted in a higher place that Descartes thought that minds could cause effects in bodies, and vice versa. So, despite thinking that minds and bodies are unlike sorts of things, Descartes idea that minds and bodies could interact. For this reason, his view is sometimes called interactionist dualism.

Merely non all dualists think this. Some dualists are epiphenomenalists: they remember that mental events are caused past physical events, but that mental events never take whatever physical effects. So the line of causation e'er goes from concrete to mental, and never in the reverse direction. Can you call back of any reason why someone would notice this view attractive? Why might it be preferable to interactionism? Does the view accept whatsoever disadvantages? Can the epiphenomenalist, for instance, give any explanation of how mental features could have evolved, if they never take any effects in the physical world?

A third multifariousness of dualism is parallelism, which is the view that, although mental and physical events run 'in parallel', there are no causal connections betwixt them. Why might one be attracted to this view? How could the correlations betwixt mental and physical events be explained by a parallelist, if at all?

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Source: https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/2006-7/20208/descartes-mind-body.html

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